Ocean Ranger, 1982

Ocean Ranger was a semi-submersible mobile offshore oil rig, with a drilling unit and living quarters, that capsized and sank in Canadian waters 43 years ago, on 15 February 1982, as a result of flooding of its port bow chain locker and upper hull caused by wave action after it experienced a 10° to 15°port bow list.

Her entire complement of 84 workers (46 Mobil employees and 38 contractors from various service companies) were killed, with no survivors.

The oil rig was 121m long, 80 m wide, and 103m high. It had twelve 20,000 kg anchors and weighed 25,000 tons. At the time, it was stated to be the world's largest semi-submersible oil rig. The vessel was drilling an exploration well on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, 267 kilometres east of St Johns, Newfoundland, for Mobil Oil of Canada Ltd.

Ocean Ranger, 1982

The day before the incident, Ocean Ranger and some other platforms in the area received reports of an approaching storm linked to a major Atlantic cyclone. Radio transmissions from the Ocean Ranger that night reported experiencing storm winds at 190 km/h and waves of 17m to 20m high, a broken porthole window and water in the ballast control room, which led to an electrical malfunction in the ballast control console. Further transmissions stated that the valves on the ballast control panel appeared to be opening and closing of their own accord.

Just after midnight on 15 February, a mayday call was sent out from the Ocean Ranger stating they had a severe 10 - 15 degree list to the port side of the rig and requesting immediate assistance. While emergency assistance was being organised, at 01:30 am local time, a transmission from the Ocean Ranger stated, “There will be no further radio communications from the Ocean Ranger. We are going to lifeboat stations”. Amid the severe winter weather, the crew left the platform in life jackets and lifeboats. The platform remained afloat for another 90 minutes after this time before sinking at approximately 03:10 am. As a result of the severe weather, the first helicopter responding to the emergency did not arrive on the scene until 02:30 local time, by which time most, if not all, of Ocean Ranger's crew had succumbed to hypothermia and drowned.

Investigation Finding Focus

A joint Federal-Provincial Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster and investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the capsizing and sinking of the Ocean Ranger were due to the flooding of the anchor chain lockers in the forward columns when it took on a 10° to 15° list in the direction of the severe wind and wave action.

The list resulted from the transfer of liquids from other tanks or otherwise filling empty or partially empty forward ballast tanks in the Ocean Ranger’s lower hull after its ballast control console suffered an electrical malfunction from seawater entering through broken portlight(s) and the crew's inability to manually control the operation of the ballast control system's valves to correct the list.

Several key contributing factors were identified in the investigation as listed below, including the platform itself having a number of design and construction flaws, particularly in the ballast control room and instructions and training not being sufficient or available. To specific issues to do with training, it was found:

The master of the Ocean Ranger, who had been on board the rig for only 20 days, did not have sufficient knowledge of the operation of the ballast system when he assumed his duties.
The duties and responsibilities of the toolpusher (person-in-charge), the master, and the control room operators on the Ocean Ranger were not well defined, and insufficient training was provided to control room operators before assignment.
The Ocean Ranger's Operating Manual did not contain adequate information or provide guidance to the Master and Control Room Operator of Emergency Procedures to be followed in the event of an electrical malfunction in the ballast control console.
The Ocean Ranger's Operating Manual did not provide adequate guidance regarding the accidental flooding of lower hull compartments or tanks of semisubmersible mobile offshore drilling units and precautions to be taken to prevent flooding of chain lockers.

Key Lessons

Training (TR) is a common Organisational Factor Type (OFT) identified during investigations using ICAM and refers to the provision of the correct knowledge and applied skills of workers necessary for them to do their jobs safely.

We often find during an investigation that organisations can produce a list of all training that workers apparently attended. However, there is very little evidence to demonstrate that the training was competency-based or that it has indeed been done, and there is no refresher training.

Common problems include insufficient, ineffective, or sometimes too much training, a lack of resources or assessment, and a mismatch of abilities to tasks.

Incidents are an opportunity to learn, and we all need to do our best to ensure the losses and impact have not been in vain. The resources from our ICAM Training provide information on what vulnerabilities in this Organisational Factor (OFT) can be caused by and what these vulnerabilities can lead to.

So what can we do from a practical sense to proactively or reactively address the ICAM Organisational Factor Type of ‘Training (TR)’? Check the information below and identify what you can do to proactively correct or reverse the vulnerabilities if they resonate with what is going on in your organisation.

OFT CODE - TR (Training):

The provision of the correct knowledge and skills of employees is necessary for them to do their job safely. Failures may involve insufficient, ineffective or too much training, lack of resources or assessment and mismatch of abilities to tasks.