SS Lake Illawarra, 1975

On Sunday evening, 5th January 1975, the bulk carrier SS Lake Illawarra entered the River Derwent in Hobart, Tasmania, with a cargo of zinc ore bound for the zinc smelter three miles north of the Tasman Bridge.

When approaching the Tasman Bridge, the ship was off course. The Captain reduced speed but found it difficult to align the 136-metre-long ship to the central navigation span of the bridge. Despite several attempts to change the course, the ship was difficult to manage, in part due to its lack of speed and strong tidal current.

Realising he was headed for a collision, the Captain finally called out full speed astern in a last attempt to change the ship's course and avoid the bridge. He urgently counter-corrected but could not make the opening, and the torque from her propeller caused the ship to slide in a broadside movement. The ship veered into the pile capping of Pier 18 and then Pier 19, bringing the three unsupported spans of the bridge crashing into the vessel's hull.

Two spans of the bridge decking collapsed. A large section of the four-lane highway landed on the ship’s deck, sinking the ship in 35 metres of water within minutes and resulting in the loss of seven crew members. Five motorists were also killed when they unknowingly drove over the bridge gap into the Derwent River. Other motorists managed to escape from the two vehicles that teetered on the gap's edge. Police and emergency services were called into action; within an hour, a ferry traversed the river in a search and rescue operation which sadly turned into a recovery operation.

The 1025m bridge was eventually repaired two years after the incident at a cost of $18m in 1977 (in today’s terms, approximately $124m). However, the SS Lake Illawarra still lies at the bottom of the Derwent River. Its cargo of zinc was deemed too dangerous to extract, so instead, her fuel was removed, and she was left to fill with silt.

ICAM Australia SS Lake Illawarra, 1975

Investigation Finding Focus

The subsequent Court of Marine Inquiry found that Lake Illawarra could pass beneath the bridge's central navigation span, but the Captain attempted to pass through one of the eastern spans “due to a combination of strong tidal currents and inattention”.

The Court found that the Captain had not “handled the Lake Illawarra in a proper and seamanlike manner” and suspended his master's certificate for six months. In response to the court's findings, a pilot service was introduced.

Key Lessons

It sometimes seems that it takes a significant incident and loss for safety enhancements to be implemented. While we will never forget the tragic loss of the crew and motorists, their loss was not in vain. The incident brought about some lasting changes to maritime safety and changes to legislation, procedures, and policies that are current to this day.

The subsequent recommendations and changes in operations following this incident included:

Visiting vessels are assessed for length and beam, as well as other key features, such as manoeuvrability, before being granted permission to transit under the bridge.
A licenced and highly trained Marine Pilot who has completed comprehensive training requirements must pilot all vessels exceeding 35 metres in length transiting under the bridge.
A TasPorts pilot vessel assists in each transit, acting as a standby and security vessel and offering a second pair of eyes for waterways hazards during the transit.
When deemed necessary, TasPorts tugboats attach to and assist vessels in the event of an emergency.
The Tasman Bridge is closed to all vehicle traffic three minutes before any bridge transit and opens again after the transit is completed.
The Hobart Port Tower, which was built in the years following the accident, is manned by trained operatives during each transit and provides a visual of the approaching waters to the Tasman Bridge.
Weather, currents and other parameters influence the timing and planning of each transit.
In addition, TasPorts pilots carry state-of-the-art portable pilotage units on board each vessel they transit to ensure a highly accurate and independent navigation aid is always available.

While these lessons and changes were implemented reactively, it is always better to consider the risks proactively without the losses. Our Risk Management (RM) Organisational Factor Type in the ICAM Organisational Factors is aimed at ensuring that there is a proactive, systematic application of management policies, processes, and procedures to the tasks of identifying, analysing, assessing, and reducing the risks that could have adverse effects on people, the environment, equipment, property, or the community.

Incidents are an opportunity to learn, and we all need to do our best to ensure the losses and impact have not been in vain. The resources from our ICAM Training provide information on what vulnerabilities in this Organisational Factor (OFT) can be caused by and what these vulnerabilities can lead to.

So, what can we do practically to proactively or reactively address the ICAM Organisational Factor Type of ‘Risk Management’? Check the information below and identify what you can do to proactively correct or reverse the vulnerabilities if they resonate with your organisation's situation.

OFT CODE - RM (Risk Management):

The systematic application of management policies, processes, and procedures to the tasks of identifying, analysing, assessing, and reducing to ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) and ongoing monitoring of risk in man-machine systems that have the potential to adversely affect people, the environment, equipment, property, or the community.

Vulnerabilities in this Organisational Factor Type (OFT) can be caused by:

Inadequate or poorly conducted risk management process
Goals, objectives, scope and boundaries of risk management activity not determined
Level of risk analysis (JSA, QRA, Safety Case etc.) inappropriate for the degree of risk or phase of the cycle
The hazard identification process not being systematic or covers all operations and equipment
A risk assessment conducted without the appropriate
Competencies / experience
Inappropriate selection or poor implementation of risk control measures
Inadequate monitoring of risk control effectiveness